What happens after after a judicial dissolution of a corporation on the grounds of deadlock? What usually happens in a dissolution. The corporation winds up its business, pays its creditors, and distributes assets to its shareholders. But if there’s a deadlock, there’s a good chance that the directors (and shareholders) won’t be able to agree on those matters, either. What happens then? In re Ravitz v. Gerard Furst and Marjorie Ravitz, DPM, P.C., 2009 NY Slip Op 06437 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 8, 2009), tells us what does not happen, at least under New York law.
The corporation in question was a podiatry practice with two equal shareholders, three offices. The two agreed that one office should be closed. They agreed that they would split the two remaining offices. The problem was that one office was more profitable than the other. The shareholder who would take the less profitable office proposed a valuation of the goodwill of each office, and a cash settlement to equalize the distribution of assets. When the other did not agree, the first asked the court to supervise the liquidation for the purpose of valuing the practices. Both the trial and appellate courts held that such a procedure was not permitted under the pertinent provisions of the New York Business Corporation Law.
Section 1008(a) of the New York General Corporation Law (NY GCL) authorizes a court to
continue the liquidation of the corporation under the supervision of the court and may make all such orders as it may deem proper in all matters in connection with the dissolution or the winding up of the affairs of the corporation
The Court held that Section 1008(a) did not authorize the appointment of a referee. Under Section 1005(a)(2), assets can only be sold at “public or private sale.” In re Ravitz, Slip Op. at 1-2. If the parties cannot agree on a private sale, the only recourse is a public sale. Id.
The appointment of a referee (special master) to mediate a possible sale, and to value the businesses, should be within the power of the court. If one of the parties is intransigent, and refuses to pay full value, should the only recourse seems to be a referee to conduct the public sale?
The Court also held that, in the absence of an agreement, goodwill was not a distributable asset. More on that later.
Hat tip to Peter A. Mahler (New Business Divorce blog), who represented the prevailing party.
Gary Rosin
Discretion and Fiduciary Duties. Bernards v. Summit Real Estate Management, Inc. (OR 2009)
Friday, August 28th, 2009Bernards v. Summit Real Estate Management, Inc., 229 Or. App. 357, 213 P.3d 1 ( Ct. App. 2009) involves a demand-refusal derivative suit by a member of two member-managed Oregon LLCs. Each LLC owns an apartment complex that is managed by Summit Real Estate Management, Inc. (apparently unrelated to any of the members). After Summit and one of its officers embezzled substantial sums from each LLC, Bernards demanded that each LLC sue them. When other members refused “without explanation,” Bernards filed a derivative suit against Summit and its officer. Later, Bernards joining the other members, alleging that breach of both contract and fiduciary duties. 213 P.2d at 360-362.
Section 63.801(b) of the Oregon LLC Act allows derivative suits on a showing of demand futility, but allows the operating agreement to change that rule. Section 5.4(d) of the operating agreement of each LLC required unanimous member consent for a derivative suit. 213 P.2d at 360-61 & 366. The Court rejected the argument that Section 5.4:
Id. at 366-67 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
As indicated by the court, Section 5.10 of the operating agreement provided that members were not liable
Id.at 364 ( emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The Court clearly saw good faith as that required of a fiduciary, rather than the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Although the Court did not discuss this, Section 63.160 of the Oregon LLC Act limits the use of operating agreements to eliminate member (and manager) liability of damages, and uses language similar to that of Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law to do so:
Section 63.160. Section 63.160(2) differs from DGCL Section 102(b)(7)(ii)
(emphasis added). Arguably, the omission in the Oregon statute of the word “or” limits the scope of “good faith.” That said, the Oregon statute also prohibits elimination of liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty. If it was not already clear that acts not in good faith breach the duty of loyalty, the Delaware Supreme Court has now settled that question as a matter of Delaware law (In re Walt Disney Litigation and Stone v. Ritter).
In any event, Section 5.10 of the operating agreement in Bernards arguably conditions the waiver of liability to acts taken in “good faith.” Thus, the exclusion of “gross negligence, fraud, or willful or wanton misconduct” applies only to acts taken in good faith.
The problem with complaint was that it did not plead any specific facts indicating misconduct by the members in rejecting the demand. The court rejected that argument that the misconduct by Summit and its officer was clear that a failure to sue them could only be explained by misconduct. 213 P.3d at 267-70.
Gary Rosin
Tags: derivative suits, fiduciary duties, LLC, waivers of liability
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