Archive for the ‘Commentary’ Category

Texas: “Reasonable Compensation” and Limitations on LLC & LP Distributions

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

Section 101.206 of the Texas Business Organization Code (TBOC) prohibits an LLC from making distributions when the fair value of its assets is, or would become, less than its total liabilities.  Section 41 of Senate Bill 1442 amended TBOC Section 101.206 so as to exclude "reasonable compensation" from the limitations of Section 101.206:

   (f) For purposes of this section, "distribution" does not include an amount constituting reasonable compensation for present or past services or a reasonable payment made in the ordinary course of business under a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program.

Similar language was included in the limitations of distributions of an LLC series, TBOC § 101.613(h) (Section 43 of SB 1442), andof a limited partnership, TBOC § 153.210(b) (Section 52 of SB 1442).

First, In the context of partnerships, TBOC Section 151.001(2) had already defined "distribution" as a transfer to a partner in the partner's "capacity as a partner". I would think that any amount a limited partnership had agreed to pay a partner as compensation for services would not transfers to the partner as partner. If the legislature wanted to make that clear, the logical place to do that would have been TBOC section 151.001(2). TBOC Chapter 151 is a "mini-hub," its provisions apply to all partnerships, and to all uses of "distribution" in Chapters 151 through 154. Adding the limitation to Section 153.210 limits the scope of the carve out.

Second, Chapter 152 (general partnerships) has no limitations on distributions. Before the advent of the LLC, that made sense; all partners were liable for partnership obligations. With the introduction of the LLP (you can blame, or credit, Texas for that), limitations on distributions seem appropriate. But neither Texas nor the RUPA have any such limitations, leaving creditors to fraudulent transfer law.

posted by Gary Rosin

Client Warning Flags (In Re Keck)

Monday, March 9th, 2009

The facts giving rise to a recent Report and Recommendations of the Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission in In re Keck, No. 06 CH 90 (March 6, 2009), shows a primary "warning flag" of a client that cannot be unsatisfied:

Catherine … and William Murphy were married on November 18, 1988 and divorced in February 2003. After the divorce action was filed in 1998, Catherine was represented by several different attorneys. She described herself as a client who was very involved, and "hands-on." In the spring of 2002, when Catherine’s divorce proceedings had been ongoing for four years and after the court ruled that a prenuptial agreement was valid, she decided that her current attorney … was overwhelmed by the case and needed the assistance of another attorney.

Id. at 2.  Four years, and several attorneys on, Catherine wanted the assistance of a new lawyer.  As Gomer Pyle would have said:  "Surprise! Surprise! Surprise!"  Guess who was the subject of a grievance? 

Hat tip to the Legal Profession blog.

posted by Gary Rosin

Care in Contracting. BASF v. POSM II Properties Partnership LP (Del. Ch. 2009)

Sunday, March 8th, 2009

BASF Corp. v. POSM II Properties Partnership LP, C.A. No. 3608-VCS, (Del. Ch. March 3, 2009) (for opinion, see Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation blog), involved tiered limited partnerships.  BASF was a limited partner in POSM II Properties Partnership, LP formed to build and lease a facility to Lyondell’s predecessor-in-interest, ARCO.  The partnership’s general partner was POSM II Properties, the initial general partner of which was ARCO (later, Lyondell Chemical Company).  BASF’s predecessor-in-interest, Mobil, had negotiated for a right to withdraw from the partnership if ARCO (or, now, Lyondell) or its affiliates no longer operated the facility.  After Basel AF S.C.A.acquired Lyondell, Lyondell became a wholly-owned subsidiary of LyondellBasel.  BASF claimed that, even though Lyondell was still operating the facility, the change in control of Lyondell triggered the withdrawal right.  Slip Op. at 3-4.

Vice Chancellor Strine, noted that the parties’ agreement tied the withdrawal right to Lyondell’s operation of the facility, and not to a change in control of Lyondell itself.  Id. at 4-7.  He declined to find a de facto change in control:

If the parties t… had reached a bargain to give [BASF] a right to walk away and be bought out upon a change of control of [Lyondell], one would have expected them to use the common technique and do that explicitly. In this regard, it is notable that change of control provisions often detail the precise scenarios that qualify, whereas, under BASF’s approach, the parties would either have to reach an after-the-fact accord on what corporate events qualified as an implied change in the operator or have a court do so. 

Delaware law does not invest judicial officers with the power to creatively rewrite unambiguous contracts in this manner.

Id. at 13  (footnote omitted).

Certainly, it’s hard to imagine that major oil companies didn’t know about acquisitions and mergers, and the effect of various structures used in acquisitions on the rights of the parties.

Hat tip, Francis G.X. Pileggi.

posted by Gary Rosin

Statute of Frauds and UBE Agreements

Tuesday, March 3rd, 2009

Thomas E. Rutledge has posted on SSRN The Statute of Frauds and Partnership/Operating Agreements, J. Passthrough Entities 41 (November-December 2008), in which he discusses a recent holding by Vice Chancellor Lamb in Olsen v. Halverson, C.A. No. 1884-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2008) that the statue of frauds applies to LLC operating agreements. This despite Section 18-101(7) of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, includes “written, oral or implied” (emphasis added).

While we might disagree over the importance of signed writings to resolve disputes about the agreement of the parties, how in the world did an Operating Agreement for a hedge fund go unsigned?

Note:  As noted in 2010 Amendments to Delaware LLC Act, the legislature has amended that Act to allow oral agreements.

posted by Gary Rosin

Holdover LLCs. Spellman v. Katz (Del. Ch. 2009)

Friday, February 20th, 2009

What happens when the practice of the members of an Unincorporated Business Entity (UBE) varies from the terms of the UBE’s constitutive documents?  In a recent opinion in Spellman v. Katz, C.A. No. 1838-VCN (Del. Ch. February 9, 2009), Vice Chancellor Noble invoked the Parole Evidence Rule to prohibit the consideration of evidence showing that the members of an LLC had disregarded a provision in the LLC Agreement. 

In Spellman, Doctors Katz, Spellman and Alfieri formed Delaware Bay Surgical Services, P.A. as the vehicle for the joint practice of medicine.  At the same time, the three also formed KSA, L.L.C.  The LLC bought a piece of property, constructed a building, Bayview Medical Center, and leased it (or a portion of it) to the PA.  At some point, Dr. Alfieri withdrew form the LLC (and, presumably, the PA), and bought one of what eventually became three "units" from the LLC.  In February, 2002, after an unsuccessful attempt to force dissolution of the PA, Dr. Spellman withdrew from the practice.  In 2002, presumably after Spellman’s departure, another unit in the building was sold.  Dr Katz continues to practice through the PA, and the PA continues to lease a unit in the building.  Slip Op., at 1-2 & nn. 1-4.

In his recent opinion, Chancellor Noble granted Dr. Spellman’s request for dissolution of the LLC and the appointment of a liquidating trustee.  Section 5.1 of the LLC Agreement provided for dissolution and winding up of the LLC

as soon as possible after the construction of the building [Bayview Medical Center] has been completed, the condominium documents have been finalized and a certificate of occupancy has been issued with respect to each condominium unit . . .

Id. at 2 (bracketed portion in the opinion’s quotation of Section 5.1).   

Although Dr Katz did not cast his argument in terms of mistake, he did argue that the members had intended the LLC to be used as the vehicle to own the facilities used by the PA in order to obtain  tax benefits.  Id. at 5.  He claimed that the members did not know of the language of Section 5.1.  Id. at 6. Chancellor Noble rejected those arguments out-of-hand:

Dr. Katz would have the Court ignore the plain language of Section 5.1 in deference to his recollection of the parties’ intention that KSA would continue as an entity long after the completion of Bayview Medical Center….

Id. at 5. 

The Chancellor also noted that Dr. Katz had not argued waiver, estoppel or acquiescence.  Id. at 6 n.20.  In retrospect, that was a mistake.  Whatever else is true, the LLC did continue doing business for over two years after the completion of the facility.  Dr. Alfieri left the practice, withdrew from the LLC, and then bought his unit (presumably, the space he had already been using).  The practice PA continued to lease the remainder of the building until Dr. Spellman left the practice, at which point the LLC sold a second unit.

How should the law handle a variance between the agreements and the practice of the parties?  Continuation of a business beyond an agreed term or undertaking, and without an express agreement to do so, was common enough that, almost a hundred years ago, the UPA addressed it (Section 23).  RUPA continues to provide for it (Section 406).  ULLCA Section 802(b) does permit the members to waive winding up, but the ULLCA does not address a continuation without a waiver.  Section 18-806 of the Delaware LLC Act does allow "revocation of dissolution," but only by "the affirmative vote or written consent of all remaining members…."

All the LLC statutes need to address the problem of "holdover" LLCs.  The R/UPA approach of falling back on the statutory default may not be the right solution.  For example, under Section 18-801(a)(1) of the Delaware LLC Act, the statutory default is perpetual existence.   One the other hand, the substance of the RUPA statutory default–an "at will" entity–may well be proper to handle holdovers.

In the absence of a legislative solution, UBE documents should address the problem.

Time to get to work.

Hat tip to the Delaware Business Litigation Report.

posted by Gary Rosin

Joint Ventures vs. Partnerships. Costa v. Borges (Idaho 2008)

Thursday, February 19th, 2009

I know that historically–before the Great Depression, perhaps even before the 20th Century–courts considered joint ventures and partnerships to be distinct business forms (for reasons that will become apparent, note my use of "forms" instead of "entities").  To be sure, the two were "similar" and courts usually applied partnership law to joint ventures.  As the Idaho Supreme Court recently put it in its opinion in Costa v. Borges, 2008 Op. No. 23, at 4, 179 P.3d 316 (Idaho February 15, 2008) (citations omitted):

Because of the similarities between partnerships and joint ventures, partnership law generally governs joint ventures.  A partnership is "an association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." "A joint adventure is generally a relationship analogous to but not identical with a partnership, and is often defined as an association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise with the objective of realizing a profit."

The opinion in Costa v. Borges then took an unexpected turn.  Because RUPA Section 201 declares a partnership to be an entity separate from its partners, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that partnership and joint venture law have parted company:

Although a partnership is now an entity distinct from its partners, "a joint venture is not an entity separate and apart from the parties composing it." There is no statute providing that a joint venture is an entity distinct from its members. There is no statutory provision allowing for the dissociation of a member from a joint venture and the continuation of the joint venture in business as a separate entity. That portion of RUPA providing for the continuation of a partnership as a separate legal entity after dissociation of a partner has no application to a joint venture.

Slip. Op. at 5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Later, the Court indicated that, even in a three-member joint venture,

However, even if the joint venture had three members it could not continue doing business after the withdrawal of one member. Because "a joint venture is not an entity separate and apart from the parties composing it," a joint venture cannot continue in business as a separate legal entity after one joint venturer withdraws.

Id. at 4-5 (citation omitted). 

The same could have been said of mid-(20th) century partnerships.  Not only does the Costas v. Borges freeze joint-venture law, it also ignores Rights of partners under UP)A Section 38(2).  A joint venture is only a partnership for a particular purpose.  Under UPA Section 38(2), after the early withdrawal of a partner in a partnership for a particular purpose, the remaining partner(s) may

continue the business of the partnership, either by themselves or jointly with others ….

That is, the question is not whether a partnership may continue after the withdrawal of one of two partners, but whether the remaining partners may continue the business without dissolution.  That said, with its emphasis on continuation of the entity, the RUPA does not adequately address continuation of the business of two-partner partnerships after the premature withdrawal of one of the partners.

Hat tip to Marc Ward.

posted by Gary Rosin

Reverse Piercing: A Single Member LLC Paradox

Wednesday, February 18th, 2009

Carter G. Bishop (Suffolk) has posted on SSRN "Reverse Piercing: A Single Member LLC Paradox," an article forthcoming in the South Dakota Law Review.  Bishop’s focus is on the rise of single member LLCs (SMLLCs) as an asset-protection vehicle, and the resulting difficulties of creditors of the single member under existing LLC law.  He suggests that, in lieu of "ad hoc equitable judicial remedies," id. at 6, the states should take the SMLLC off the table as an asset-protection vehicle:

every state would amend its SMLLC legislation to provide that upon the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the only economic interest in the SMLLC, the transferee will be admitted as a substituted member, with or without the consent of the only member.

Id. at 70.

On the Florida Asset Protection blog, Jonathan Alper notes that, in FTC v. Olmstead, the remedies of creditors of the sole member of an SMLLC are now before the Florida Supreme Court via a certified question. He has a recent post on the oral arguments in FTC v. Olmstead.

There also has been an interesting discussion of this on LNET-LLC.

Hat tip to Paul Caron.

posted by Gary Rosin

Allocations vs. Distributions. More on Casavecchia v. Mizrahi

Tuesday, February 17th, 2009

As mentioned in my earlier post on the Casavecchia v. Mizrahi series of cases, the essence of the Casavecchia’s claims was that

  1. the LLC had been formed to develop a single real estate development, Hills of the Heartland,
  2. the development had been completed, and all units sold, and
  3. instead of distributing profits, the Mizrahi had instead loaned the LLC’s funds to another LLC in which the Casavecchias were not participating.

I have already noted the disconnect between the Casavecchia’s understanding of the parties’ prior practice–one development at a time, and the formation of a new vehicle for new projects–and the breadth of the purpose provision of the LLC’s Operating Agreement. 

But here are other puzzling aspects of the trial court’s original order, Cassavecchia v. Mizrahi, No. 008635/2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 23, 2006) (Warshawsky, J.).  At first, it seemed as though Justice Warshawsky had ordered a defacto dissolution of the LLC.  In this connection, note that Section 701 only allows voluntary dissolution without a vote of the members only when the organizational documents provide for a time for dissolution, or dissolution on the happening of a specified event.  Section 702 of the New York Limited Liability Company Law allows for judicial dissolution at the request of a member "whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the  business in conformity with the articles of  organization or operating agreement."  To the extent Warshawsky found a limited purpose, he could have found a voluntary dissolution under Section 701 or, perhaps that it was "not longer reasonably practicable" a purpose that had been completed.  But that’s not what the order said.

On closer reading, Warshawsky casts the issue as

The issue that emerges for determination is whether a reading of  ¶ 8,together with ¶¶ 4, 6 and 9 leads to the conclusion that profits of the Hills of Heartland venture should be allocated and distributed to the shareholders so that they have the right to control their use. See e.g. LLCL § 507, Interim Distributions.

Slip Op., at 3 (emphasis added).  Section 4 of the Operating Agreement set forth a broad, rather than a narrow, purpose of the LLC.  Id. at 2.  Section 6 provides for management by action of a majority in interest, which itself is consistent with the early statement that Mizrahi managed the day-to-day affairs of the LLCId.  Section 9 provides for distributions "at the times and in the amounts determined by a majority in interest".  Id.  Section 507 of the New York LLC Law provides for interim distributions to members

to the extent and at the times or upon the happening of events specified in the operating agreement….

Section 8 of the operating agreement provides for the allocation of profits and losses to the members.  Slip Op., at 3.  Warshawsky then noted the dispute as to the purpose of the LLC, and concluded

While it is conceivable that [LLC] could build homes and lend money out of profits so generated, that plan of operating would have to be approved by all the investors in the venture as they are the lawful beneficiaries of the success of any LLC.

Slip Op., at 4. (emphasis added).

It is clear that, while Warshawsky contemplates interim distributions, the basis for his order of "an inquest … to determine the profits available for distribution" is not entirely clear.  Does he deem that the Cassavecchias’ own a majority of interest, so can decide to make distributions?  Does he instead believe (wrongly) that allocations under Section 8 give the members the right to distributions?  Why else would he suggest that the diversion of profits into a loan would require the approval of all investors?

posted by Gary Rosin

Transactional Perspectives on Casavecchia v. Mizrahi

Wednesday, February 11th, 2009

The still on-going litigation arising out of Hills of Heartland LLC can help illuminate the role of a transactional lawyer.  The latest installments are two opinions out of the NY Appellate Court, 2nd department, Casavecchia v. Mizrahi, 2008 NY Slip Op 00938 & 2008 NY Slip Op. 00939 (NY AD [2nd] December 16, 2008).  The appellate opinions grow out of orders by Judge Warshawsky (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County) on August 23, 2006 and on September 11, 2007.  The point here is not to parse the opinion, but to note the inconsistency between the LLC’s operating agreement and the practice of the parties.

Casavecchia and Mizrahi were serial real estate developers who

were in business together for many years constructing and marketing residential housing of which Hills of Heartland is just one. Allegedly, as a development was completed , the profits were used to finance the building of a new development. There came a time when plaintiff was no longer associated with the business.

Order, September 11, 2007, at 2.  One of the key disputes between Casavecchia and Mizrahi related to the role (and purpose) of Hills of Heartland LLC.  In the Order of August 26, 2006, Judge Warshawsky found that the purpose of Hills of Heartland LLC was solely to develop Hills of Heartland: 

Defendant bootstraps section 202(f) & (c) of the LLC on to the Hills of Heartland Operating Agreement to support the claim that the purpose of the Company was to build and to lend money. He unfolds a rather convoluted claim that plaintiff was interested in the Company lending money rather than distributing it when the Company acquired a parcel of land on which it has now completed development….   * * *  His profound ending is that the process of lending retained money rather making a distribution to investors is a sage and efficacious way of doing new business with old money.

* * *  The only dispute in the arguments of the parties … is whether the Company was formed to lend money. 

Despite thoroughly and carefully searching the record the court can find no evidence that it was.  Defendant’s assertion is unsupported by evidentiary proof in admissable form …. He testified that the Company had not made any loan. He admitted in the answer that it was formed to build homes.

Id. at 4. 

Mizrahi’s attorney appears to have focused on Section 202(f) of the New York Limited Liability Company Law, which includes in the laundry list of general powers of an LLC the power to "lend  money for any lawful purpose, invest or reinvest its funds…."  Earlier in the opinion, Judge Warshawsky had quoted paragraph 4 of the LLC’s Operating Agreement, which included an omnibus purpose clause:

4.  PURPOSE. The Company is formed for the purpose of acquiring, owning, operating, developing, constructing buildings of all kinds or nature and selling real estate and engaging in any lawful act or activity for which limited liability companies may be formed under the LLCL and engaging in any and all activities necessary or incidental to the foregoing.

Order of August 26, 2006, at 2 (emphasis added). 

The point here is not to assess Judge Warshawsky’s conclusion, could well have been influenced by the fact that he loaned the LLC’s funds to a company in which the Casavecchia’s had no ownership interest:

that defendant Mizrahi is the only investor in the Company who is actively involved in Casa Mason, the proposal of being an unsecured, unguaranteed, interest free lender to a Mizrahi entity appears to be a bountiful bonanza to only defendant.

Id. at 5.

Instead, assuming that the parties’ prior practice had been to invest in particular development projects via project-related unincorporated business entities (UBEs), why did the purpose clause not only refer to investment in real estate generally, but also include an omnibus purpose clause?  Surely, some transactional dropped the ball here, probably by trying to save drafting time by pulling out a form. 

There is more that I could say, but I’ll stop here.

posted by Gary Rosin

Creditors and Interests in LLEs: A Rant on Reading Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor

Wednesday, February 4th, 2009

In Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 2008 NY Slip Op 09848 (NY AD [1st], December 16, 2008), the Court correctly vacated a trial court

pre-judgment order confirming the ex parte attachment of their membership interests in 23 entities, including Delaware, Georgia and Florida limited liability companies and a solely owned Florida corporation, and the subsequent orders conditionally appointing a receiver of those out-of-state interests.

Slip Op at 2. 

The odd thing about the trial court order, and in the appellate opinion, is the absence of recognition of the concept of charging orders.  In most states, including New York, a charging order is the exclusive manner by which a creditor can get at an interest in a limited liability entity (LLE).  One would hope that somewhere among the trial court judge, the four appellate justices, and the eleven (!) lawyers listed in the opinion–and their associates or clerks), someone might have brought that concept to the attention of the court.  Perhaps someone did, but that person’s advice was ignored. 

Certainly, that must say something about the state of legal education system and its products (lawyers).  But only about a third of law schools offer a separate course in Agency, Partnerships and LLEs.  Even in those schools, most students do not take both Corporations and A&P.  The usual Business Associations course virtually ignores agency, and only gestures in the direction of partnerships and LLEs; then it’s off to talk about public corporations and control transactions.

posted by Gary Rosin