In Tutti Mangia Italian Grill v. Amer. Textile Maintenance Co., No. B227191 (Cal. Ct. App. 7/18/11), one of the issues was whether an agent who signed a contract containing an arbitration agreement was authorized to sign the contract. The Court held that there was substantial evidence to support a finding of “ostensible” authority:
First, Christian signed the written agreement as the “General Manager” for TMIG, and a general manager generally has the authority to enter into agreements for the corporation. Second, the arbitrator found, based upon testimony at the arbitration hearing, that Christian “was in fact holding himself out as the General Manager and as one authorized to sign.” Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‟s finding that Christian was TMIG‟s ostensible agent, and thus, we conclude that there was a valid arbitration clause that required TMIG to arbitrate this matter.
Slip Op., at 12-13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
I know that “California’s a brand new game.” But apparent authority, and the other forms of power to bind by an unauthorized act, generally require some sort of conduct (or possibly negligence) on the part of the principal, and not just assertions by the agent alone. It even says that in Section 2317 of the California Civil Code:
Ostensible authority is such as a principal, intentionally or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a third person to believe the agent to possess.
So, the the arbitrator, the trial court and the Court of Appeal (Second District, Division 4) all misapplied the law.
But the arbitrator also found some of the facts necessary for a ratification:
There was never any disavowal of said Agreement by [TMIG] who impliedly accepted the benefits of same by operating thereunder.
Slip Op. at 4-5. The contract was for “the provision of restaurant linens,” id. at 2, so the restaurant presumably took delivery of, and used, the linens. That’s probably the acceptance of benefits to which the restaurant was not entitled, except under the contract. The ” no partial ratifications” rule would prevent accepting only part of the contract (the linens), but not the other part (the arbitration agreement).
That said, the existence of an arbitration clause may be a material fact that might allow the restaurant to “avoid” its implied ratification, if it did not know of the clause.
posted by Gary Rosin
This entry was posted on Wednesday, August 24th, 2011 at 2:45 pm and is filed under Agency, Cases, Commentary. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.
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Sources of Apparent Authority: Tutti Mangia Italian Grill v. Amer. Textile Maintenance Co. (Cal. Ct. App.)
In Tutti Mangia Italian Grill v. Amer. Textile Maintenance Co., No. B227191 (Cal. Ct. App. 7/18/11), one of the issues was whether an agent who signed a contract containing an arbitration agreement was authorized to sign the contract. The Court held that there was substantial evidence to support a finding of “ostensible” authority:
Slip Op., at 12-13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
I know that “California’s a brand new game.” But apparent authority, and the other forms of power to bind by an unauthorized act, generally require some sort of conduct (or possibly negligence) on the part of the principal, and not just assertions by the agent alone. It even says that in Section 2317 of the California Civil Code:
So, the the arbitrator, the trial court and the Court of Appeal (Second District, Division 4) all misapplied the law.
But the arbitrator also found some of the facts necessary for a ratification:
Slip Op. at 4-5. The contract was for “the provision of restaurant linens,” id. at 2, so the restaurant presumably took delivery of, and used, the linens. That’s probably the acceptance of benefits to which the restaurant was not entitled, except under the contract. The ” no partial ratifications” rule would prevent accepting only part of the contract (the linens), but not the other part (the arbitration agreement).
That said, the existence of an arbitration clause may be a material fact that might allow the restaurant to “avoid” its implied ratification, if it did not know of the clause.
posted by Gary Rosin
This entry was posted on Wednesday, August 24th, 2011 at 2:45 pm and is filed under Agency, Cases, Commentary. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.