Texas Closes Door on Ederer Liability to Other Partners in LLPs

June 19th, 2009

In Ederer v. Gursky, 9 N.Y.3d 514, 881 N.E.2d 204, 851 N.Y.S.2d 108, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09960 (2007), the New York Court of Appeals interpreted the New York LLP shield to allow claims by partners for breach of obligations of other partners, or of the partnership.  See my earlier post, Liability of LLP partners To Each Other

Section 47 of Senate Bill 1442 amends Section 152.801(a) of the Texas Business Organizations Code to read as follows:

     (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) or the partnership agreement, a partner in a limited liability partnership is not personally liable to any person, including a partner, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, for a debt or obligation of the partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability partnership.

Oddly, the Legislature chose to add "or the partnership agreement" to the introductory exception.  Like the RUPA, Texas has a central provision regarding partner autonomy and its limits.  TBOC § 152.002.  While the Legislature may have felt a "belt and suspenders" approach was necessary to catch the attention of the courts, it seems bad policy to start dropping in references to the partnership agreement.

posted by Gary Rosin

Contracting re Fiduciary Duties in Texas UBEs

June 17th, 2009

Yet another way in which unincorporated business entities (UBEs) under the Texas Business organizations code ("TBOC") differ is the ability to contract as to fiduciary duties.

General Partnerships (Chapter 152).  Section 152.002(B)(2)-(4) are parallel to RUPA section 103(b)(3)-(5).  That is, no eliminations of the Section 152.204-.207 duties, but excluded specific activities or standards, so long as not manifestly unreasonable.

Limited Partnerships (Chapter 153).  Chapter 153 is a RULPA-type statute, so Section 153.003(a) generally incorporates Chapter 152, and a general partner has the same rights, powers and restrictions, and liabilities as a partner in a general partnership, § 153.152.

Limited Liability Companies (Chapter 101).  Section 101.401 is based on the early version of Delaware LLC 18-1101(c)(2):  the company agreement may "expand or restrict" duties, including fiduciary duties, and related liabilities.  As suggested by the Delaware Supreme Court in Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.,817 A.2d 160, expanding or restricting probably does not include eliminating.  Id. at  166-68.  Such an interpretation would be consistent with Section 152.002(b)(2-(4), but without an express "manifestly unreasonable" limitation.  Would a "manifestly unreasonable" limitation be the equivalent of an elimination?

posted by Gary Rosin

More Texas & Creditors of Owners

June 16th, 2009

We have already noted the preemption of Sections 9.406 & 9.408of the Texas UCC and the elimination of the right to foreclose a charging order on an ownership interest in a Texas LLC.  The rights of creditors of owners of interests in Texas unincorporated business entities (UBEs) under the Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC") vary widely, depending on the form of UBE:

  • Ownership interests in all forms of Texas UBEs subject to TBOC–(general) partnerships, limited partnerships and LLCs–are excluded from 9.406 and 9.408 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code.  TBOC §§ 101.106(c) & 154.001(d) (added by Sections 39 and 57 of Senate Bill 1442) (TBOC Chapter 154 is one of two mini-hubs that apply to both (general) partnerships and limited partnerships).
  • TBOC chapter 152, and its predece

ssor statute, deleted the concept of charging orders, as applied to interests in (general) partnerships.  Compare TBOC §§ 152.401-.406 with TBOC §§ 101.108-.112 and TBOC §§ 153.251-.257.  As a result, the traditional remedies–attachment, garnishment, etc.–are available to creditors of owners of interests in (general) partnerships.

  • A charging order is the exclusive remedy for a judgment creditor of an owner to reach an ownership interests in either a limited partnerships or an LLC.  TBOC §§ 101.112 (LLCs) & 153.256 (limited partnerships).
  • Senate Bill 1442 amended TBOC Section 101.112 by adding Subsection (c), which prohibits foreclosure of charging orders on ownership interests in LLCs.  SB 1442, § 40.  [Correction]  A similar change was made to TBOC Section 153.256 (charging orders against ownership interests in limited partnerships).  SB 1442 § 53. [Hat tip to Stephen Paine for reminding me of the dangers of posting when you are tiered!.

    In part, these differences are a matter of path dependence (adoption of new statutes at different times).  I had hoped that the most-recent legislative session might harmonize creditor remedies.  Instead, they beefed up the limited partnership and LLC charging order provisions, and left general partnerships hanging. 

    To paraphrase the old saw, when the legislature is session, you need to lock-up your spouses, children and pets!  That's why we only let them meet for five months every two years!

    posted by Gary Rosin
    (with edits 06/16/2009)

  • More Texas Hurdles for Creditors of LLC Members or Limited Partners

    June 12th, 2009

    Tom Rutledge has already pointed out that SB 1442 pre-emptsSection 9.406 and 9.408 of the Texas UCC.  Sections 40 and 53 of the bill go even further, and adds language that prohibits the foreclosure of a "charging order lien", whether "under this code or any other law," for ownership interests in LLCs and in limited partnerships.  Tex. Bus. Org. Code §§ 101.112(c) & 153.256(c)  (emphasis added).

    posted by Gary Rosin
    revised 06/19/2009

    Texas Adopts Series LLCs

    June 12th, 2009

    Among things, SB 1442 amends the Texas Business Organizations Code  to provide for series LLCs.  Id.at § 45 (adding Subchapter M, §§ 101.601 et/ seq.).  The Bill Analysis describes the amendment as follows:

    S.B. 1442 authorizes the creation of a series limited liability company by allowing a limited liability company agreement to establish or provide for the establishment of one or more designated series of members, managers, membership interests, or assets

       that has separate rights, powers, or duties with respect to specified property or obligations of the company or profits and losses associated with specified property or obligations, or

       that has a separate business purpose or investment objective.

    The bill sets out provisions relating to

       the enforceability of the obligations and expenses of a series against its assets,

       the holding of assets associated with a series, and

       the requirements for a notice of limitation on the liabilities of a series.

    The bill 

       establishes the general powers of a series;

       provides that a member or manager associated with a series or a member or manager of the company is not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a series unless the company agreement specifically provides otherwise; and

       allows the company agreement to expand or restrict any duties, including fiduciary duties, and related liabilities that a member, manager, officer, or other person associated with a series has to the series or the company, a member or manager associated with the series, or a member or manager of the company.

    The bill

       authorizes the company agreement to establish classes or groups of members or managers associated with a series and

       sets forth provisions relating to

    the governing authority of a series,

    the effect of certain events on a manager or member with respect to a series,

    the status of a member with respect to a distribution,

    the establishment of a record date for allocations and distributions, and

    the making of distributions with respect to a series.

    The bill establishes that the provisions of law related to limited liability companies apply to a series limited liability company and its associated members and managers, to the extent the provisions governing each company are not inconsistent.

    The bill

       authorizes a series and its business and affairs to wind up and terminate without causing the winding up of the company[,]

       provides that the series terminates on the completion of the winding up process[,}.

       … specifies the conditions that require the winding up of a series and sets out procedures for the winding up and termination[, and]

       …  provides for the revocation of a voluntary winding up, the cancellation of an event requiring a winding up, the authority of a series to continue business following either situation, and the winding up by order of a district court with appropriate jurisdiction.

    Id. at 4-5 (indentations added).

    While the general approach of Subchapter M is a statute-within-a-statute, Section 101.609 includes a general incorporation of Chapter 101 (The tex. Bus. Org. Code "spoke" for LLCs):

    Sec. 101.609. APPLICABILITY OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER; SYNONYMOUS TERMS.

         (a) To the extent not inconsistent with this subchapter, this chapter applies to a series and its associated members and managers.

         (b) For purposes of the application of any other provision of this chapter to a provision of this subchapter, and as the context requires:

         (1) a reference to "limited liability company" or "company" means the "series";

         (2) a reference to "member" means "member associated with the series"; and

         (3) a reference to "manager" means "manager associated with the series."

    posted by Gary Rosin

    The Ubiquity of Agency Law. Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, Inc. (Ind. 2009)

    May 29th, 2009

    When talking to a former student, perhaps the most frequent observation is that they regularly use agency law in their practices.  For example, consider the opinion in Conwell v. Gary Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, Inc., No. 82S04-0806-CV-00309 (Ind. May 19, 2009).  Conwellinvolved the ownership of a website designed (and hosted) by Gray Loon for Piece of America (LP) (PoA).  When PoA didn't pay Gray Loon, it took the website off its server, and refused to give the website files to PoA.  Later the files were destroyed.  PoA sued, claiming that Gray Loon had converted its property. 

    At this point, you may be wondering how agency law applies.  Under copyright law, the owner of the copyright in a work is the author of the work, unless the work was a "work for hire."  Apparently, in deciding whether there was a work for hire, it makes a difference whether the work was done by an employee or by an independent contractor.  If the former, it is presumed to be work for hire, unless otherwise agreed.  If the latter, it is presumed not to be a work for hire, unless agreed in writing.  Slip Op., at 12-15.

    The only other interesting aspect of the case is the way the Court analyzed the status of Gray Loon.  The Court quoted the standard used by the U.S. Supreme Court, and then concluded:

    Considering these factors, it seems plain enough that Gray Loon was an independent contractor rather than POA's employee. The website was thus not a "work made for hire."

    Slip Op., at 15.  That's it.  Nothing about how the facts fit into the factors.  A great example of how not to write an opinion, or an essay on an exam. 

    Speaking of exams, back to grading.

    Hat tip to Ben Barros, PropertyProf blog.

    posted by Gary Rosin

    Texas adopts 9-406/408 Carve-outs for LLC and Partnership Interests

    May 26th, 2009

    Section 39 of Texas S.B. 1442 provides, inter alia, for 9-406 and 9-408 carve-outs for membership interests in an LLC. Specifically, it is provided that a new subsection (c) will be added to Section 101.106 of the Texas Business Organizations Code to provide:

    Sections 9.406 and 9.408, Business & Commerce Code, do not apply to a membership interest in a limited liability company, including the rights, powers and interests arising under the company’s certificate of formation or company agreement or under this code. To the extent of any conflict between this subsection and Section 9.406 or 9.408, Business & Commerce Code, this subsection controls. It is the express intent of this subsection to permit the enforcement, as a contract among the members of a limited liability company, of any provision of a company agreement that would otherwise be ineffective under Section 9.406 or 9.408, Business & Commerce Code.

    A similar revision appears at section 57, there addressing interests in a partnership. You may also want to take a look at sections 60 and 61 of that bill, which amend 9-406 and 9‑408 to expressly provide that they do not apply to interests in either an LLC or a partnership.

    The effective date is 9/1/09.

    posted by Thomas E. Rutledge

    Update:  The House Bill Analysis of Section 39 describes the amendments as follows:

    Provides that Sections 9.406 (Discharge of Account Debtor; Notification of Assignment; Identification and Proof of Assignment; Restrictions on Assignment of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes Ineffective) and 9.408 (Restrictions on Assignment of Promissory Notes, Health-Care-Insurance Receivables, and Certain General Intangibles Ineffective), Business & Commerce Code, do not apply to a membership interest in a limited liability company, including the rights, powers, and interests arising under the company's certificate of formation or company agreement or under this code. Provides that to the extent of any conflict between this subsection and Section 9.406 or 9.408, Business & Commerce Code, this subsection controls. Provides that it is the express intent of this subsection to permit the enforcement, as a contract among the members of a limited liability company, of any provision of a company agreement that would otherwise be ineffective under Section 9.406 or 9.408, Business & Commerce Code.

    Id. at 9 (emphasis added).

    posted by Gary Rosin

    AALS Call for Papers

    May 8th, 2009

    The AALS Section on Agency, Partnerships. LLCs and Unincorporated Associations has issued a call for papers for the 2010 annual meeting of the AALS (2010 New Orleans) on the topic of "Vicarious, Individual and Limited Liability:  Responsibility for Wrongful Conduct and Unincorporated Firms".

    Tort raise claims both theoretical and practical  questions when an individual tortfeasor is associated with an unincorporated firm.  Should the firm's organizational status shield the individual from liability, comparable to a shield against contract claims?  When does an individual's conduct constitute tortious conduct, especially when the individual works as part of a group?

    And when, and to what extent, is the firm itself–or its owners–subject to liability?  The circumstances under which any firm–(whether or not incorporated–should be subject to vicarious liability are highly contested, most recently in the Exxon Valdez latigation before the United States Supreme Court.

    More generally, should the law differentiate between unincorporated and incorporated firms and their owners in resolving such questions?

    Drafts, abstracts or outlines should be submitted no later than September 1, 2009 to the Section's Chair, Deborah De Mott, demott@law.duke.edu,

         postd by Gary Rosin

    LLCs and Fiduciary Duties: A Glimmer of Hope for Delaware

    May 6th, 2009

    I have criticized many Delaware opinions for dicta saying that there are no fiduciary duties in Delaware LLCs unless they are expressly contracted for (what I have called the "mere contractual entity" approach).  The recent opinion in Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC,C.A. No. 3658-VCS (Del. Ch. Ct. April 20, 2009) (Mem. Op.) ("Bay Center"), gives me reason to hope that Delaware has not lost its way.  In Bay Center,Vice Chancellor Strine denied a motion to dismiss, among other things, claims of breach of fiduciary duty.  In discussing the fiduciary duty claim, Strine began by emphasizing the inherently fiduciary character of the relationship between an LLC's manager and the LLC and its members.  Slip Op. at 17-18. 

    Another important aspect of the opinion is VC Strine's treatment of a purported waiver of fiduciary duties in section 6.2 of the LLC Agreement:

    Section 6.2  Liability of Members.  . . .  Except for any duties imposed by this Agreement . . . each Member shall owe no duty of any kind towards the Company or the other Members in performing its duties and exercising its rights hereunder or otherwise.

    Slip Op.at 19 (emphasis in original).  Strine found that Section 6.2 conflicted with Section 6.1(b), which provided

    Section 6.1  Relationship of Members. Each Member agrees that, to the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware Act and except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement or any other agreement to which the Member is a party: . . . (b) The Members shall have the same duties and obligations to each other that members of a limited liability company formed under the Delaware Act have to each other.

    Slip Op. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).  As a result, the LLC Agreement was ambiguous.  Even though, to survive on a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must offer only areasonable interpretation that supports their claim, VC Strine indicated that a reading of the LLC Agreement as allowing fiduciary duties under Section 6.1(b) was more reasonable than a reading that Section 6.2 controlled.  Accord to VC Strine, the latter reading would make Section 6.1(b) meaningless.  Slip Op.at 19-20.  Last, VC Strine invoked traditional principles of interpretation of fiduciary waivers:

    And, the interpretive scales also tip in favor of preserving fiduciary duties under the rule that the drafters of chartering documents must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.  As a result, the defendants’ interpretation of the fiduciary duty provisions of the LLC Agreement is not the most reasonable interpretation, let alone the only reasonable interpretation.

    Slip Op. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

    For additional discussion of various aspects of Bay Center, see analysis by Prof. Larry Ribstein, and by Francis G.X. Pileggi.

        posted by Gary Rosin

    Sole Member of LLC Is Not the “Owner” of LLC Property . 3519-3513 Realty, LLC v. Law (N.J. Superior App. 2009)

    May 6th, 2009

    In 3519-3513 Realty, LLC v. Law, 967 A.2d 954 (N.J. Superior App.  Div. 2009) (slip opinion), the Court rejected an attempt by the sole member of an LLC to evict a tenant of a unit in a building owned by the LLC.  The statutory grounds for the attempted eviction was that the "owner" wanted to personally occupy the unit.  The Court refused to treat the building as owned by the sole member:

         Appellant argues that [the sole member]formed [the LLC] for the protection it afforded him individually in terms of potential liability.  [He] had every right to decide to arrange his affairs in that manner.  At the same time, he must accept the concomitant burdens that follow from the choice he made.

         Finally, appellant contends that adopting the trial court's construction unreasonably requires expenditure of money and time to transfer the property back to [the sole member's] name, individually, with the accompanying risk of incurring personal liability.  While not unsympathetic to the dilemma posed, we are not free to relieve [him] of the consequences which flow from the considered choices he earlier made.

    posted by Gary Rosin